The Rock-Scissors-Paper game has been studied to account for cyclic behaviour under various game dynamics. We use a two-person parametrised version of this game to illustrate how cyclic behaviour is a dominant feature of the replicator dynamics. The cyclic behaviour is observed near a heteroclinic cycle, in a heteroclinic network, with two nodes such that, at each node, players alternate in winning and losing. This cycle is shown to be as stable as possible for a wide range of parameter values. The parameters are related to the players' payoff when a tie occurs. Using some applications to price setting models, we illustrate the contribution of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game to the understanding of cyclic dominance in two-player games.
Introduction
The Rock-Scissors-Paper game (henceforth, RSP) has been used to model behaviour and learning in both economics and the life sciences. In the context of one-person or population dynamics, it provides a good model for both convergent and oscillating dynamics, the type of dynamics depending, of course, on some parameters of the model. In the life sciences, a classic example is that of the evolution of the three types in a population of lizards of the species Uta Stansburiana. The model of RSP replicates well the oscillatory nature among the three types. See, for instance, Sinervo and Lively [26] 1 for the story of the lizards or Szolnoki et al. [27] for a general review of cyclic behaviour in nature.
In economics, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium has been used to illustrate price dispersion and the game itself to support the cyclic behaviour of prices (set by a population of sellers or firms). The literature goes back at least to Edgeworth [6] , who predicted the existence of price cycles without mention of RSP. From the point of view of concrete applications, price cycles were observed by Noel [19] in the Toronto retail gasoline market, where cycling among several price levels, from low to high and back again, is reported for major and independent firms. Static models of price dispersion are presented, for instance, by Varian [29] , Morgan et al. [18] and Salop and Stiglitz [22] . The model of [29] is then used to introduce discrete-time dynamics in a duopoly model by Kovac and Schmidt [13] , exhibiting periodic dominance.
The use of the RSP game to model price dispersion can be found in Hopkins and Seymour [12] , where the existence of price dispersion seems to depend on the absence of informed consumers, under positive definite adaptive dynamics. In laboratory experiments price cycling is reported in Cason et al. [5] under gradient dynamics and an experiment directed at illustrating cyclic behaviour in RSP can be found in Cason et al. [4] , where the issue of learning under best-response is present. In [12] , learning on the side of consumers prevents price dispersion. The cyclic behavior in these models is due to the existence of a limit cycle. Further examples of this may be found in Semmann et al. [24] in the context of public goods, as well as by Mobilia [17] and Toupo and Strogatz [28] in the context of populations under different types of mutation.
We are interested in the existence of cyclic dominance (where players exchange a winning position cyclically) under the classic replicator dynamics in a two-person RSP game and its application to price dispersion modelling. The one-person RSP game does not exhibit isolated limit cycles, which explains why the models above use dynamics other than the replicator. However, the RSP may exhibit some type of cycling when solutions converge to a heteroclinic cycle on the boundary. A heteroclinic cycle consist of equilibria and trajectories connecting them so that a player will sequentially play Rock, Scissors and Paper indefinitely. From a strictly abstract point of view, the interaction of individuals modelled by the RSP game has been addressed numerically by Sato et al. [23] .
In this paper, we address stability of cyclic behaviour in the strategic interaction of two players of RSP through the stability of a heteroclinic cycle. Aguiar and Castro [1] show that the dynamics support a heteroclinic network made of pairs of pure strategies and solutions connecting them in a suitable quotient space. This network can be seen as consisting of (a) three cycles, one of which involves alternate win-loss of both players, and two involving a tie and loss by only one of the players;
(b) two cycles for which play goes through all possible combinations of outcomes in the two possible orders.
Although cycles in a network cannot be asymptotically stable, they can exhibit a strong type of stability, known as essential asymptotic stability, first introduced by Melbourne [16] . We show that the cycle where players never tie is essentially asymptotically stable when the sum of payoffs for a tie is negative. In this case, a tie is not an attractive outcome for at least one of the players for whom the payoff is negative and hence, as an outcome, it is avoided. This cycle models the existence of alternating dominance between two players. The fact that it possesses some stability shows that the RSP game is a good tool for modelling cyclic behaviour also under replicator dynamics. The remaining cycles are less stable and therefore harder to observe in applications or numerical experiments.
Our results indicate that RSP may be a useful model to study strategic interaction in economics. The dynamics of the gasoline retail market in Noel [19] show that the major and independent firms alternate in setting the highest price (see Figure 1 therein). If we assume that consumers buy at the lowest price, then major and independent firms alternate in winning and losing in an RSP game where the actions are "fix lowest price", "fix highest price" and "fix intermediate price". This corresponds to the win-loss cycle in (a) above. Considering the pricing model of Hopkins and Seymour [12] , the two-person RSP game allows the introduction of the consumers as players by choosing to be "uninformed", "little-informed" and "well-informed". We discuss these models further in Section 5.
The dynamics arising from the interaction of two players can be very complex and we do not attempt to find detailed specific applications. We do however hope that this first approach and its results can open the door to further research in this context. This article is organised as follows: the next section contains preliminary material which may be skipped by the reader familiar with the dynamics near heteroclinic networks. Section 3 describes the two-person RSP game and its cycles. Section 4 provides a thorough study of the stability of all the cycles in the dynamics of RSP. Detailed calculations are deferred to an appendix, as is the necessary information to describe the trajectories of points near each cycle in the RSP network. Section 5 suggests a possible first approach to an extension to two players of the models by Noel [19] and by Hopkins and Seymour [12] . The last section concludes.
Definitions and preliminaries
Consider a smooth vector field f : R n → R n described by a system of differ-
An equilibrium 2 ξ ∈ R n for (1) satisfies f (ξ) = 0. Given two equilibria
is a solution trajectory of (1) which is backward asymptotic to ξ i and forward asymptotic to ξ j .
A heteroclinic cycle is a flow-invariant set C ⊂ R n consisting of an ordered collection of saddle equilibria {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ m } and connecting trajectories κ j,j+1 , j = 1, . . . , m, for (1), where ξ m+1 = ξ 1 . A heteroclinic network is a connected union of finitely many heteroclinic cycles.
We say that f is Γ -equivariant for some finite group Γ acting orthogonally on R n if f (γ · x) = γ·f (x), for all γ ∈ Γ and x ∈ R n . Then we say that γ ∈ Γ is a symmetry of f . Background on differential equations with symmetry can be found in [10] .
The Γ -orbit of x ∈ R n is the set Γ (x) = {γ · x, x ∈ Γ } . The elements in the Γ -orbit of an equilibrium for (1) are also equilibria. A group orbit of an equilibrium is called a relative equilibrium. The image of a heteroclinic connection between two equilibria ξ i and ξ j for (1) under the action of γ ∈ Γ is a heteroclinic connection between γ · ξ i and γ · ξ j .
Consider a subset S ⊂ R n . The set of all Γ -orbits of S is called the quotient space. The flow of f restricts to a flow on the quotient space whenever S is flow-invariant. By identifying a group orbit in S with a point in the quotient space, we can study the dynamics on S via the dynamics in this quotient space.
In generic systems, heteroclinic connections between saddles can be broken by arbitrarily small perturbations. A sufficient condition for preserving their structure relies on the existence of flow-invariant subspaces. We say that a heteroclinic cycle C is robust if each connection κ j,j+1 is contained in a flow-invariant subspace P j such that ξ j is a saddle and ξ j+1 is a sink for 2 Equilibria are sometimes called fixed points or steady states.
the flow restricted to P j , for j = 1, . . . , m. Robust heteroclinic cycles arise naturally in equivariant systems (e.g. [7] ) as well as in game theory and population dynamics (e.g. [11] ). In the latter flow-invariant subspaces occur in the form of extinction hyperplanes.
It is well known that heteroclinic cycles are visible in applications and numerical simulations if they are stable. Within a heteroclinic network a cycle is never asymptotically stable. It can however exhibit strong attraction properties, which have been classified into various types of stability, as follows.
We use terminology of [20] : let S ⊂ R n be a compact set invariant under the flow Φ t (·) of the system (1) and ǫ, δ > 0. Given a metric d on R n , we write
for an ǫ-neighbourhood of S and
for the δ-local basin of attraction of S. By ℓ (·) we denote Lebesgue measure in the appropriate dimension. Melbourne [16] 
A weaker form of attractiveness is established by Podvigina [20] through the definition of fragmentary asymptotic stability. Complete instability is formulated as apposed to f.a.s. in [20] . Podvigina and Ashwin [21] define an index in order to describe the stability of compact invariant sets.
Definition 2.4 ([21]
). For a compact invariant set S, a point x ∈ S and ǫ, δ > 0, set
The (local) stability index of S at x is
where
For δ small and fixed before taking the limit, we use the convention that
It is important to note that the stability index is constant on trajectories of the flow, see Theorem 2.2 in [21] . In particular, the stability index of a heteroclinic connection κ i,j can be computed for an arbitrary point x on κ i,j . We then describe attraction properties of heteroclinic cycles and networks by making use of a finite number of indices, namely the ones along their connections. Theorem 2.4 in [21] allows us to reduce the dimension of the sets that need to be measured by restricting to a section transverse to the flow.
The following two results relate e.a.s. and f.a.s. to the sign of stability indices. Set ℓ 1 (·) for the 1-dimensional Lebesgue measure.
Theorem 2.5 (Theorem 3.1 in [15] ). Let C ⊂ R n be a heteroclinic cycle or network with finitely many equilibria and connecting trajectories. Suppose that ℓ 1 (C) < ∞ and that the stability index σ loc (x) exists and is not equal to zero for all x ∈ C. Then, generically, C is e.a.s. if and only if σ loc (x) > 0 along all connecting trajectories. Lemma 2.6 (Lemma 2.5 in [9] ). Suppose that for x ∈ C the stability index
In what follows we drop the subscript loc for ease of notation.
The Rock-Scissors-Paper game
We examine the long-term dynamics for the two-player Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game. Each player has three possible actions R (rock), S (scissors) and P (paper) engaging in a cyclic relation: R beats S, S beats P, P beats R. Our description of the RSP interaction is based on [23] and [1] : two agents, say X and Y , choose simultaneously one action among {R, S, P}. The payoff of the winning action is +1 while the payoff of the losing action is −1. If a tie occurs with both agents choosing the same action, the respective payoffs are parametrised by quantities ε x , ε y ∈ (−1, 1). The normal form representation of the game is given by two normalised payoff matrices
whose columns and rows respect the order of actions R, S, P. Each element of the matrix A (resp. B) is the payoff of the row agent X (resp. Y ) playing against the column agent Y (resp. X).
The agents' choices are expressed in the form of state probabilities of playing R, S and P. At time t, these are x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ ∆ X for agent X and y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) ∈ ∆ Y for agent Y , where ∆ X and ∆ Y denote the unit simplex in R 3 associated to each agent. We define x and y as column vectors. The three vertices of ∆ X and ∆ Y correspond to the choice of a pure strategy. We then refer to those only as R, S and P.
The pair (x, y) ∈ ∆ = ∆ X × ∆ Y ⊂ R 6 represents the state of the game at a particular time. The game dynamics evolves according to the reinforcement learning governed by the coupled replicator equations
where (Ay) i and (By) j are, respectively, the ith and jth element of the vectors Ay and Bx. The unique Nash equilibrium is (x * , y * ) = at which both agents are indiferent among all three actions. This is also a steady state of the dynamics. There are nine additional steady states corresponding to the vertices of ∆. All steady states are saddles.
The nine vertices together with the edges of ∆ form a heteroclinic network. Aguiar and Castro [1] analitically prove its existence. This network can be described both as the union of three heteroclinic cycles C 0 , C 1 and C 2 , with
and as the union of two heteroclinic cycles C 3 and C 4 , with
The vector field associated to (2) is equivariant under the action of the symmetry group Γ generated by
The Γ -orbits of the steady states (R, P), (R, S) and (R, R) are, respectively, the following relative steady states:
These represent the three possible outcomes, win, loss and tie. For example, agent X is the loser at ξ 0 , wins at ξ 1 and ties at ξ 2 .
Due to symmetry, the dynamics of (2) can be studied from the dynamics on a quotient space. The restricted flow to this space contains the quotient heteroclinic network with one-dimensional connections between two of the relative steady states: ξ 0 , ξ 1 and ξ 2 . The quotient cycles are described as (see Figure 1 )
and
Notice that the coordinate hyperplanes as well as all sub-simplices of ∆ are flow-invariant subspaces. In particular, every heteroclinic connection Table 1 : Flow-invariant subspaces and representatives for connections in the quotient network.
, is of saddle-sink type in a two-dimensional boundary of ∆. Denote this subspace by P ij . Evidently, P ij is not a vector subspace of R 6 . For convenience we find a three-dimensional vector subspace of R 6 , labelled Q ij , also invariant under the flow such that P ij ⊂ Q ij and κ i,j persists in a robust way. Representatives of all connections in the quotient network and respective flow-invariant subspaces that contain them are listed in Table 1 .
Stability of the RSP cycles
In this section we establish the stability properties of the heteroclinic cycles C p , p = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, by looking at the stability of the individual heteroclinic connections. First the behaviour of trajectories passing close to each cycle is captured by Poincaré maps defined on suitable cross sections to each connection. Due to an appropriate change of coordinates, these are the product of basic transition matrices, one for each connection of the cycle. All details can be found in Appendix A. We then compute the stability indices along heteroclinic connections making up every C p -cycle. We use the results of [9] , which deal with the calculation of stability indices for heteroclinic cycles comprised of one-dimensional connections lying in flow-invariant spaces of equal dimension. In particular, C p satisfies this assumption for any p.
The main tool in our analysis is the function [9, Definition 3.8] , which can be related to the stability index as follows: suppose that the intersection of the local basin of attraction of a compact invariant set S with a cross section transverse to the flow at x ∈ S is given by (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ R 3 : max {|x 1 |, |x 2 |, |x 3 |} < δ and |x
is the local stability index for S at x relative to this intersection, i.e. F index (α) = σ loc (x). See Appendix B.1 for the explicit form of F index (α). For a heteroclinic cycle, we denote by σ j the local stability index along the trajectory leading to the steady state ξ j . For ease of reference, we reproduce a result from [9] , which determines the stability indices of heteroclinic cycles such as those in the RSP game. 
Applying Theorem 4.1 to the C 0 -cycle gives the stability indices of both heteroclinic connections in the cycle. (ii) if ε x + ε y < 0, then the stability indices are
and the cycle is e.a.s.
Proof. In
Step 1, we establish that Lemma B.1 holds if and only if ε x +ε y < 0. This is enough to prove part (i) according to Theorem 4.1(a). In Step 2, when ε x + ε y < 0, we use the function F index to calculate the stability index for each heteroclinic connection in the C 0 -cycle. We show that both indices are positive; hence it follows from Theorem 2.5 that C 0 is e.a.s.
Step 1: Consider the transition matrices M (0) and M (1) associated with the C 0 -cycle in (12) of Appendix A.2. Since they are similar 4 , conditions (i)-(ii) of Lemma B.1 will simultaneously hold, or not hold, true for either matrices. Set then M ≡ M (0) . The eigenvalues of M are the roots of the characteristic polynomial
where Tr (M) is the trace of M, Det (M) is its determinant and
The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra states that p(λ) = 0 has precisely three roots λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 ∈ C such that
Det (M) = λ 1 λ 2 λ 3 = 1.
By virtue of the Routh-Hurwitz Criterion (see Arnold [2] ), the number of roots with positive real part equals the number of sign changes of the sequence
For all ε x , ε y ∈ (−1, 1) we have
Hence, there is exactly one root with positive real part. It is, in fact, real since p(λ) has three roots. Let λ 1 ∈ R and λ 1 > 0. We make the following
Claim:
The characteristic polynomial p(λ) has one real root, λ 1 , and a pair of complex roots, α ± βi.
Let λ max be the maximum in absolute value root of p(λ). Since
We then prove that ε x + ε y > 0 is equivalent to λ 1 = λ max . Because
we have the following three cases to consider.
Case 1: suppose Tr (M) < 0 and B (M) > 0, that is, ε x + ε y > 0; thus
Replacing the first in the second equation we obtain λ 2 1 < α 2 + β 2 , and therefore λ 1 = λ max .
Case 2: suppose tr (M) > 0 and B (M) < 0, that is, ε x + ε y < 0; a procedure analogous to the one above shows that λ 1 = λ max .
Case 3: suppose Tr (M) < 0 and B (M) < 0; from (4) and (5), we can write
and proceed by contradiction.
(a) if ε x + ε y > 0 and λ 1 > 1, then λ 1 = λ max and
However, the left-hand side is negative as α < 0, which is absurd. Accordingly, if ε x + ε y > 0, then λ 1 = λ max .
(b) if ε x + ε y < 0 and 0 < λ 1 < 1, then |λ max | = α 2 + β 2 and
But now the left-hand side is positive as α < 0. Hence, if ε x + ε y < 0, then λ 1 = λ max .
The three cases above show that (i) and (ii) of Lemma B.1 are satisfied if and only if ε x + ε y < 0.
We prove next that (i)-(ii) guarantee condition (iii) of Lemma B.1 for either transition matrix. Let w max,0 and w max,1 , respectively, be the eigenvectors of M (0) and M (1) associated with the eigenvalue λ max . In particular, (iii) holds true if all the coordinates of w max,0 and w max,1 have the same sign.
with λ max = λ 1 , i.e λ 1 ∈ R and λ 1 > 1. Again, by similarity, the same remains valid for M (1) . Direct computation reveals that w max,0 has coordinates multiple of
Since λ 1 > 1 and ε y ∈ (−1, 1), the first two coordinates clearly have positive signs. From Det (M) = 1 and p(λ 1 ) = 0, we get λ 1 (λ 2 1 − Tr (M) λ 1 + B (M)) = 1, and therefore the third coordinate is also positive. In addition, the coordinates of w max,1 can be obtained from those given above for w max,0 simply by replacing ε y by ε x . Then analogously coordinates of w max,1 are all positive.
Finally, we prove the claim. The discriminant of the real cubic polynomial (3) is
For a fixed value of ε x ∈ (−1, 1), we can regard ∆(ε x , ·) as a real quartic polynomial in the variable ε y . This polynomial has in turn a discriminant given by
which is negative for all ε x ∈ (−1, 1). Hence, ∆ (ε x , ·) has two distinct real roots and two complex conjugate non-real roots. Because, for every ε x ∈ (−1, 1),
and the coefficient of the leading term of ∆ (ε x , ·) is positive, we have
for all ε x , ε y ∈ (−1, 1). Accordingly, p (λ) has one real root and two complex conjugate non-real roots.
Step 2: From (13), the local basin B Simple algebra attests that v max,0 is a constant multiple of the vector
and hence its entries are all non-negative for any ε x , ε y ∈ (−1, 1). It follows that
In the same way,
On the other hand, we get
This determines for all ε x , ε y ∈ (−1, 1)
so that
Interchanging ε x and ε y in the calcultations above, we obtain for all ε x , ε y ∈ (−1, 1)
The stability of the remaining heteroclinic cycles in the quotient network of the RSP game is given in Theorems 4.3-4.6. The proofs are omitted as they are analogous to that of Theorem 4.2, using the appropriate transition matrices in Appendix A.2. In the statement of the following theorems it is useful to define 
and the cycle is f.a.s. 
and the cycle is f.a.s. Notice that the heteroclinic cycles C 3 and C 4 never exhibit any kind of stability. This justifies their absence from the numerical observations made by Sato et al. [23] . The heteroclinic cycles C 1 and C 2 are never e.a.s., making them difficult to detect in simulations. They are f.a.s. in a subset of the complement of the stability region for the C 0 -cycle. The regions of stability of the cycles C 0 , C 1 , and C 2 are depicted in Figure 2 .
Applications
We show how the two-person RSP game provides a model where the cyclic dominance observed in two different contexts is captured. In the model of Noel [19] , let the players be a major firm (player X) and an independent firm (player Y ). Let the payoff correspond to the income from sales and each player choose among (R) fix a low price; (S) fix an intermediate price;
(P) fix a high price.
A low price (R) beats an intermediate price (S) because the higher number of buyers compensates for the loss in price. An intermediate price (S) beats a high price (P) for the same reason. A high price (P) beats a low price (R)
Figure 2: Regions in parameter space where the cycles C 0 , C 1 and C 2 exhibit some stability. The lines in the figure are: (a) ε x + ε y = 0;
. because, even though there are fewer buyers, the price difference makes up for the reduction in sales. Assume that consumers buy the cheapest between two consecutive price levels but when faced with a high and a low price, consumers associate quality to the highest price and buy at this price. The cycle C 0 corresponds to the following sequence of outcomes [12] and let aggregate sellers be Player X and aggregate consumers be Player Y . The actions for the two groups are as follows, where we use "s" for sellers and "c" for consumers to distinguish among R, S and P, Within the sellers, the relation among the possible actions is as suggested for the model of Noel [19] . Within consumers, being very well informed (P-c) beats being poorly informed (R-c) since a deal can be obtained which compensates the investment made to obtain the information. Being reasonably informed (S-c) beats being very well informed (P-c) since a good enough deal can still be obtained without spending so much on gathering information. Being poorly informed (R-c) beats being reasonably informed (S-c) because poor information is free and there is still a chance of coming across a good deal.
Assume that sellers want to sell at the highest possible price. Assume also that consumers want to buy at low prices and not spend on gathering information if they can avoid it. However, when well informed they will not buy at a very high price. We have the following relations among the possible choices, leading to the cycle C 0 :
• P-c beats R-s because gathering a lot of information puts pressure on the sellers to lower their price (Y wins);
• R-s beats S-c because consumers spent unnecessarily to gather information (X wins);
• S-c beats P-s because a reasonably informed consumer will not buy at a high price (Y wins);
• P-s beats R-c because the goods are sold at a high price (X wins);
• R-c beats S-s because the seller could have sold for a higher price to the reasonably informed consumer (Y wins);
• S-s beats P-c because the goods are bought anyway (X wins).
Concluding remarks
Making use of recent developments in the study of dynamical systems, particularly in the study of stability of heteroclinic cycles, we classify all the cycles of the RSP game according to their stability as a function of two parameters. These two parameters describe the payoff players receive when the outcome of their choice of actions is a tie and we allow the payoffs to range from almost as bad as a loss to almost as good as a win. We show that when at least one player has a negative payoff for a tie, low enough that the sum of payoffs for a tie is itself negative, then both players avoid any choice of action leading to a tie. This is a situation that is as stable as possible. The corresponding situation when the sum of payoffs for a tie is positive is not as stable, although it does exhibit some low level of stability if payoffs at a tie are high enough. This can be explained by the fact that if the players oscillate between a tie and a win for one (same) player, then the player that never wins is not very happy with the situation and tries to deviate. These results are consistent with numerical simulations and experiments referred throughout the current work and may help to clarify empirical examples of the RSP cycles discovered in nature and economics. We note that this two-person RSP game is not zero-sum 5 , consistent with Sigmund's [25] concern that "For most types of social and economic interactions, the assumption that the interests of the two players are always diametrically opposite does not hold." In particular, the payoff matrices reflect asymmetry which is a feature that arises either in interpopulation or intrapopulation interactions. Social and economic dilemmas between consumers and sellers, firms and workers are examples of situations where agents frequently adopt asymmetric positions. Also, differences in access to, and availability of, resources asymmetrically affect individuals' behaviour within each class of agents.
We recall that Hopkins and Seymour [12] have shown that the existence of informed consumers precludes price dispersion. This is the case, however, in a model where only the firms are players. The present article thus complements the information provided in [12] by inlcuding buyers as players in an equal footing to the firms. Price dispersion appears here not because different firms set different prices but because firms choose different prices over time. Our price dispersion is in line with the temporal price dispersion of Varian [29] .
A Transitions near the RSP cycles
In this section we describe the construction of Poincaré maps (also called return maps) from and to cross sections of the flow near each equilibrium once around the entire cycle. The Poincaré maps are the composition of local and global maps. The local maps approximate the flow in a neighbourhood of an equilibrium. The global maps approximate the flow along a connection between two consecutive equilibria.
Near ξ j , we introduce an incoming cross section H in,i j across the connection [ξ i → ξ j ] and an outgoing cross section H out,k j across the connection [ξ j → ξ k ], j = i, k. By definition, these are five-dimensional subspaces in R 6 . However, Krupa and Melbourne [14] showed that not all dimensions are important in the study of stability as followed. 
A.1 Poincaré maps
Assume that the flow is linearisable about each equilibrium. Locally at ξ j , we denote by −c ji < 0 the eigenvalue in the stable direction through the connection [ξ i → ξ j ] and e jk > 0 the eigenvalue in the unstable direction through the connection [ξ j → ξ k ]. Each equilibrium actually has two outgoing connections emanating from it and two incoming connections leading to it. Looking at ξ j from the point of view of the sequence of connections [ξ i → ξ j → ξ k ], we say that −c ji is contracting, e jk is expanding, −c jl and e jm are transverse with j = i, k, l, m, i = l and k = m (see [9, 14, 20, 21] ). The linearised flow in relevant local coordinates near ξ j is given bẏ
such that v, w and (z 1 , z 2 ) correspond, respectively, to the contracting, expanding and transverse directions. Table 2 provides all eigenvalues restricted to those directions for the three equilibria ξ 0 , ξ 1 and ξ 2 . The cross sections above are reduced to a three-dimensional subspace and can be expressed as Integrating (7) Expressions for global maps depend both on which connection and cycle one considers. Following [1, Remark p. 1603], in the leading order any global map ψ jk is well represented by a permutation.
We describe the details for the cycle C 0 = [ξ 0 → ξ 1 → ξ 0 ]. The other cases are similar and therefore we omit the calculations. Notice that Γ ((R, P) → (S, P) → (S, R)) = C 0 .
We pick, respectively, the connections [(R, P) → (S, 
A.2 Transition matrices
Consider the change of coordinates η ≡ (η 1 , η 2 , η 3 ) = (ln v, ln z 1 , ln z 2 ) .
The maps g j : H 
B.1 The function F index
The function F index : R N → R used to calculate the stability indices along heteroclinic connections is defined in [9] .
For N = 3 and any α = (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 ) ∈ R 3 , denote α min = min {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 } and α max = max {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 }. From [9, Appendix A.1], we have 
